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Antitrust Liability for Municipal Action
and Concerted Attempts by Businessmen
to Influence Such Action: Separate but
Unequal-An Anomaly Persists
I. Introduction
Antitrust1 law presents an anomaly when anticompetitive mu-
nicipal2 action is subjected to the scrutiny of the Sherman Act,' but
concerted efforts to influence such action are granted an exemption.'
This discord stems from two firmly entrenched, yet unrefined anti-
trust doctrines.
In the benchmark decision of Parker v. Brown,5 the United
States Supreme Court enunciated the ubiquitous Parker doctrine.
6
I. The term "antitrust" connotes the antipathetic public sentiment directed towards
trusts and monopolies when Congress was contemplating the Sherman Act in the late 1880's.
The extent of this antipathy, however, was much greater than might be expected.
In the years immediately before the Sherman Act, between 1888 and 1890,
there were few who doubted that the public hated the trusts fervently. Those
who fanned the prejudice and those who hoped to smother it agreed that the fire
was already blazing. Radical agitators and polite reformers spoke admiringly of
the "people's wrath."
W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 55 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
LETWIN].
2. The word "municipal" was derived from
the municipium of [the Roman] law [which] was in legal theory, if not always in
practice, an independent city or free town, having the right of Roman Citizen-
ship, governed by its own laws as respected local affairs, but united by voluntary
political ties to the republic as regarded general interest and sovereignty.
E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2.19, at 157 (3d. ed. 1971). Thus, the term
"municipal" generally pertains to a "local governmental unit, commonly a city or town." Id.
See Sessions v. State, 115 Ga. 18, 21, 41 S.E. 259, 260 (1902).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976). Section one of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract,
combination ..., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States
.is declared to be illegal." Id. at § 1. Section two states: "Every person who shall monopo-
lize or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of trade or commerce among the several States, ... shall be deemed
guilty of a felony. ... Id. at § 2.
4. A California district court acknowledged the anomaly that this comment addresses in
In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1072, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 1979),
rev'd on reassignment, 521 F. Supp. 568 (N.D. Cal. 1981), affd, 1982-93 Trade Cas. (CCH)
1 65,039. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
5. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
6. The Parker doctrine is also commonly referred to as the "state action" doctrine. In
Parker, the Supreme Court examined whether a marketing program established under the
California Agricultural Prorate Act was preempted by the Sherman Act. The Court found
"there is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in the [Sherman] Act's legislative
This antitrust concept immunizes valid government action even
though a restraint on trade occurs. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
on the other hand, is the derivation of two other Supreme Court de-
cisions-Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc.7 and United Mine Workers v. Pennington.8 Essentially,
the Noerr-Pennington exemption shields joint attempts to persuade
government officials from antitrust enforcement.
Although the Parker and Noerr-Pennington doctrines are simi-
lar, they are not coterminous.9 The Parker doctrine is a product of
preemption as articulated in the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution.10 The Supreme Court, however, has generally
ignored the true underpinnings of the Parker holding. Instead the
Court has tended to rely upon an exemption"' rationale when either
state or municipal activities are at issue. In contrast, the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine is predicated on the first amendment right to peti-
tion the government for a redress of grievances. This constitutional
derivation lends such extraordinary freedom to the petitioner that
courts overlook unethical conduct which is intended to eliminate
competition. 2
In Community Communications Corp. v. City of Boulder,13 the
United States Supreme Court rendered its most recent attempt to
clarify the scope of the Parker doctrine. The majority14 relied upon
history." 317 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added). Case law following Parker and its commentators
use the terms interchangeably. See generally Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v.
Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1976).
7. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
8. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
9. The fact that the two doctrines are not coterminous is best exemplified when "an
unsuccessful attempt to influence government action may fall within the Noerr-Pennington
immunity, but not the Parker immunity. Conversely, a state regulatory agency may decide to
restrain competition without prompting; the beneficiaries, not having solicited government ac-
tion, would enjoy a Parker immunity but not one based on Noerr-Pennington." George R.
Whitten, Jr. Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 29 n.4 (lst Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
10. The supremacy clause provides: "This Constitution and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ..., shall be the Supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
I1. Justifiable exemptions from the antitrust laws exist, but it is incorrect for a court to
claim that the state action doctrine is based on an antitrust exemption. See Handler, Anti-
trust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1374-88 (1978). In addition to the Noerr-Pennington
exemption, protection from the antitrust laws is recognized for a wide range of activities. See,
e.g., Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (professional baseball
exemption). See also Noukes, Agricultural Cooperatives, 33 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 7 (1966)
(various practices of agricultural cooperatives are exempt from the antitrust laws).
12. In Noerr, the Supreme Court considered it "legally irrelevant" that the railroads'
sole purpose in seeking to influence the passage and enforcement of laws was to destroy the
trucking industry as a competitor, or that the railroads had engaged in unethical business
practices through their publicity campaign. 365 U.S. 127, 138-42.
13. 344 U.S. 40 (1982).
14. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, and was joined by Justices Mar-
shall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens.
an exemption approach to decide that the Boulder ordinance,"
which restrained expansion by a cable television supplier, did not
merit immunization from Sherman Act scrutiny. Three members of
the Court,16 however, concurred in a strong dissent that addressed
the issue in the proper context of a preemption analysis.17
The most recent articulation of the controversial Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine occurred in In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Liti-
gation.'8 The Ninth Circuit'" confronted the issue whether there ex-
ists a commercial exception to the Noerr-Pennington immunity.
20
The Airport Car Rental court concluded that concerted attempts by
business2" to persuade a commercial, profit oriented, but state owned
airport to enact anticompetitive standards2 2 for on-airport car rental
operation were protected under the auspices of the first
amendment.
23
This comment analyzes the factors creating the anomaly that
occurs when municipal action is held to be within the purview of the
Sherman Act, but the joint efforts that prompt such activity fall
15. The municipal action objected to by the Community Communication Corporation
(CCC) was the enactment of an ordinance prohibiting it from expanding its business into other
areas of Boulder for a period of three months. The city planned to draft a model cable ordi-
nance during this period, and then invite new cable television companies into Boulder under its
terms. The city of Boulder decided that a temporary ordinance was necessary because if CCC
was permitted to expand during the drafting of the model ordinance then potential competitors
would be discouraged from entering the market. 455 U.S. at 46.
16. Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissenting opinion, and was joined by Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justice O'Connor.
17. The City of Boulder dissent succinctly stated its position as follows: "I think it quite
clear that questions involving the so-called 'state action' doctrine are more properly framed as
being ones of preemption rather than exemption." 455 U.S. at 62 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
18. 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 65,039 (9th Cir. 1982).
19. Circuit Judges Sneed and Farris joined in an opinion by Circuit Judge Choy.
20. The commercial exception imposes Sherman Act scrutiny upon joint efforts to influ-
ence government officials to perform a commercial or proprietary act as opposed to a legisla-
tive or policy making function. For a thorough treatment of the plausibility of a commercial
exception, see generally Comment, Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity and Proprietary
Government Activity, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 749 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Noerr-
Pennington Antitrust].
21. The businessmen were defendants the Hertz Corporation (Hertz) and National Car
Rental System, Inc. (National).
22. The plaintiff Budget Rent-A-Car (Budget), alleged that defendants jointly influ-
enced and engaged with airport authorities to adopt and enforce particular standards and re-
quirements which determined whether a company was eligible to operate an on-airport car
rental concession and the manner in which it was to be run. In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust
Litigation, 521 F. Supp. 568, 571 (N.D. Cal. 1981). Some examples of the alleged restrictions
are:
[I] Not allowing more than a given number of on-airport automobile rental con-
cessions at any given airport.
[2] Placing persons other than [defendants] who operated on-airport automobile
rental concessions at competitive disadvantages by placing such persons' facili-
ties such as counters, parking lots, ready spaces, holding spaces and car washes
at undesirable locations at the airport, and by not allowing such persons to have
some of the facilities at the airport location at all.
Id. at 571 n.3. Nine similar restrictions were also included in the allegations. Id.
23. Airport Car Rental, 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,039, at 70,793.
outside the scope of the Act. To facilitate this inquiry, the founda-
tions of the Parker and Noerr-Pennington doctrines are established.
The judicial treatment of the doctrines' respective underpinnings is
then traced through subsequent case law with an emphasis placed
upon recent decisions.
The thrust of this comment is a recommendation that courts
should acknowledge the preemptive origin of the Parker doctrine.
The comment then suggests that heightened scrutiny should be ap-
plied to the processes that petitioners implement under the protective
cloak of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
II. The Sherman Act
Antitrust policy is the primary method used by the United
States government to maintain economic competition. 4 The basic
federal antitrust law, the Sherman Act,25 was enacted amid "ram-
pant cartelization26  and monopolization2 7 of the American econ-
omy.'28 The Act was passed, therefore, to inhibit such combinations
and restraints upon trade in all sectors of the economy.2
Determining what the proper goal of the Sherman Act should
24, The United States Supreme Court expounded upon the concept of encouraging com-
petition in United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna
Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic
freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection
of our fundamental personal freedom. And the freedom guaranteed each and
every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete-to assert with
vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can
muster.
Id at 610.
25. In addition to the Sherman Act, there were several important supplementary stat-
utes which elaborated and extended some of the principles of the Sherman Act. The statutes
also established additional enforcement provisions. In 1914, Congress passed both the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-44 (1976), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1976). The Federal Trade Commission Act established the Federal Trade Commission and
stated, in broad language, that unfair methods of competition in commerce are unlawful. The
Clayton Act is a more comprehensive statute than the Sherman Act, and specifies offenses
more precisely. Section two of the Clayton Act, which forbids certain discriminations in price
and in services, was amended in 1936 by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).
See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 3, at 13-14 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as L. SULLIVAN]; see also F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT (1962, 1964 Supp.); Dam, The Economics and the Law of Price Discrimination:
Herein of Three Regulatory Schemes, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. I (1963).
26. The cartelization process is the method "by which two or more separate firms may
act concertedly to obtain and exercise power. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 25, § 59, at 152.
27. Monopolization occurs, in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, if a firm has deliber-
ately followed a course of market conduct through which it has obtained or maintained power
to control price or exclude competition in some part of the trade or commerce covered by the
Act. Id. at § 7, at 29.
28. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 23 (1976) [hereinafter cited as R. POSNER]. Posner
explained that the drafters of the Sherman Act were primarily concerned with the effect that
monopolies and cartels had on price and output. Id. See Bork, Legislative Intent and the Pol-
icy of the Sherman Act, 9 LAW. & ECON. 7 (1966).
29. See supra note 1.
be raises a controversial facet of antitrust enforcement.3" Despite the
prevailing uncertainty,31 however, the fundamental purpose of pre-
serving a competitive economy endures and provides the basis for
tenets such as the Parker and Noerr-Pennington doctrines.
Ill. The Parker Doctrine
1. Genesis.-Although the United States Supreme Court's opinion
in Parker v. Brown32 has evolved into one of the most critically ex-
amined antitrust decisions,33 not all commentators recognize the true
origin of the state action doctrine. 34 The Court, in Parker, clearly
based its holding on two earlier opinions 35 that similarly involved
government ownership and operation of an economic activity.
In Lowenstein v. Evans,36 the State of South Carolina created a
state liquor monopoly that empowered state agents with the exclu-
30. Proponents for economic efficiency as the exclusive object of antitrust law are repre-
sented in part as follows: R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 91 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
R. BORK]; R. POSNER, supra note 28, 4, 8-22. Most commentators, however, do not take this
position. See, e.g., C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER; ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 11-18 (1965); Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat fro") Chaff, 86
YALE L.J. 974, 980-81 (1977).
31. In analyzing the intent of the drafters of the Sherman Act numerous commentators
claim to have resolved the paradox of what the proper goal of the Sherman Act should be. One
commentator emphatically states, however, that "such talk of legislative intent is more than
usually foolish." Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 783 (1965). Bork maintains, "[t]he preservation of competition
was certainly one of the major policies motivating the passage of the Sherman Act [but] Con-
gress simply had no discoverable intention that would help a court decide a case one way or
another." Id.
The prevailing uncertainty stems from the dilemma faced by the drafters of the Sherman
Act. Representative Stewart of Vermont identified the problem faced by the original
legislators:
[T]here are two great forces working in human society in this country to-day,
and they have been contending for the mastery on one side or the other for the
last two generations. These two great forces are competition and combination.
They are correctives of each other, and both ought to exist. Both ought to be
under restraint. Either of them, if allowed to be unrestrained, is destructive of
the material interests of this country.
21 CONG. REC. 5956 (1890) quoted in LETWIN, supra note 1, at 97.
32. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
33. Despite the attention Parker presently receives, the decision went virtually unnoticed
in 1943 except for cursory treatment by two law reviews in their "Recent Decisions" sections.
See 41 MICH. L. REv. 968 (1943); 27 MINN. L. REV. 468 (1943).
A sampling of the current abundance of commentators addressing Parker is as follows:
Handler, supra note 6; Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the
Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (1974); Slater, Antitrust and Government
Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 71 (1974).
34. See, e.g., Kintner & Kaufman, The State Action Antitrust Immunity Defense, 23
AM. U.L. REV. 527, 528 (1974); Posner, supra note 33, at 693; Slater, supra note 33, at 71-
72; Note, The Antitrust Liability of Municipalities Under the Parker Doctrine, 57 B.U.L.
REV. 368, 370-71 (1976). Only a few commentators have recognized the Parker doctrine's
much earlier roots. See Simmons & Fornaciari, State Regulation as an Antitrust Defense: An
Analysis of the Parker v. Brown Doctrine, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 61 (1974); Teply, Antitrust
Immunity of State and Local Governmental Action, 48 TUL. L. REV. 272 (1974).
35. 317 U.S. at 341. See Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895); Olsen v.
Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
36. 69 F. 908 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895).
sive right to manufacture and sell all alcoholic liquors within the
state. a7 The court held the statutory monopoly to be immune from a
Sherman Act attack. Accordingly, the Supreme Court, in Olsen v.
Smith,3 8 found certain Texas laws regulating pilotage to be outside
the realm of the Sherman Act.39 In effect, the Olsen Court sustained
a state regulatory scheme conferring oligopoly power upon those
properly licensed.4 ° Simultaneously, the Court countenanced a com-
bination to exclude non-licensed pilots. 41 Hence, the Lowenstein and
Olsen decisions provided the groundwork from which a workable
state action doctrine could later be formulated.
2. Parker v. Brown.4 -In Parker, a producer and packer of
raisins in California brought suit to enjoin enforcement of a state
program for marketing raisins. The critical issue was whether the
California Agricultural Prorate Act 43 was rendered invalid by the
Sherman Act. The state action was attacked on grounds that it re-
stricted competition among growers and maintained prices in the dis-
tribution of the commodity to packers."'
In dismissing these contentions,4 5 the Parker Court confronted
the preemption issue which resulted from the interplay between state
and federal governmental enactments.4 The Supreme Court held
that since the state, as sovereign, imposed the restraint under its leg-
37. A treble damage action claiming that the monopoly violated the Sherman Act was
brought when South Carolina officials seized a shipment of liquor sent into the state by a
North Carolina manufacturer. Id.
38. 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
39. The Texas pilotage laws created a Board of Commissioners empowered to fix pilot
charges, determine pilot qualifications, hear complaints brought against pilots, regulate their
manner of performance, appoint pilots, and prohibit non-licensed persons from partaking in the
pilotage business. Id. at 339-40.
40. Handler, supra note 33, at 12.
41. Id. The Court, in Olsen, further maintained that "if the State has the power to
regulate [pilots], . . . it must follow that no monopoly or combination in the legal sense can
arise from the fact that the duly authorized [state agents] are alone allowed to perform the
duties devolving upon them by law." Id. at 345.
42. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
43. See CAL. AGRIC. CODE §§ 59501-60015 (West 1968). The California prorate pro-
gram originated with the assistance of the United States Department of Agriculture and the
Commodity Credit Corporation. Loans acquired from the latter were made possible by recom-
mendations from the Secretary of Agriculture. 317 U.S. at 358-59.
44. 317 U.S. at 346.
45. The prorate program was also attacked for alleged violations of the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 and the Commerce Clause. Id. at 348-49. These challenges
proved unsuccessful. Id. at 368.
46. Since the intent of Congress can be substantive or jurisdictional, state action may be
invalidated as an interference with the federal design either because of an actual conflict be-
tween federal and state law or because, whatever its substantive effect, there is federal occupa-
tion of the field. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-23, at 376-77 (1978). In
the benchmark decision of Hines v. Davidowitz, the Supreme Court addressed the critical issue
of statutory interplay as it invalidated a state alien registration law in light of a federal statute
governing similar conduct. 312 U.S. 52 (1941). The Hines Court declared that whether state
action has been preempted depends on whether it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id. at 67.
islative authority, the Sherman Act did not preempt the state pro-
gram.4 7 In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized that the lan-
guage and the legislative history of the Sherman Act make no
mention of an intent to restrain such an act of government despite
the California Agricultural Prorate Act's anticompetitive effect.4"
The Parker Court included, however, the caveat that "a state does
not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by author-
izing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful." '49
3. Framework of Subsequent Case Law.-For more than
thirty years after the Parker decision the United States Supreme
Court did not elaborate on the state action doctrine. 50 Finally, in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,51 the Court unanimously adopted a
"threshold inquiry '  for state action disputes. The Goldfarb Court
asserted that an anticompetitive government activity must be "com-
pelled"53 by state direction to be within the ambit of the Parker doc-
trine.54 Goldfarb focused on a minimum fee schedule for lawyers55
enforced by the Virginia State Bar. The Court found that although
the defendant state bar was a state agency for "limited purposes, "56
the bar's activities did not meet the state action threshold
requirement."
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court further expounded upon
the state action doctrine in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Company.58
The Court's analysis addressed a power company's free light bulb
47. 317 U.S. at 352.
48. Id. at 350-51.
49. Id. at 351.
50. During this thirty year period the Supreme Court constantly denied certiorari to
cases that presented an issue of state action. E.g., Export Liquor Sales, Inc. v. Ammex Ware-
house Co., 426 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971); George R.
Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (lst Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 850 (1970); E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 362 F.2d
52 (Ist Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966). Although the state action doctrine was
virtually ignored by the Supreme Court between 1943 and 1975, the Court mentioned the
doctrine in three of its decisions. See Continental Ore. Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,
370 U.S. 690 (1962); Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127 (1961); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
51. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
52. Id. at 790-91.
53. The Court also substituted the term "required" for "compelled" when referring to
the necessary state direction. Id. at 790.
54. Id. at 790-91.
55. The plaintiffs alleged that operating the minimum fee schedule constituted price
fixing in violation of § I of the Sherman Act. Id. at 778.
56. The Court noted that "[t]he fact that the state agency for some limited purposes
does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for the
benefit of its members." Id. at 791.
57. Id.
58, 428 U.S. 579 (1976). The majority in Cantor consisted of a plurality of Justices
Stevens, Marshall, White, and Brennan, with the concurrence of Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun. Justice Stewart delivered the dissent and was joined by Justices Powell and
Rehnquist.
program under which bulbs were distributed contingent upon a cus-
tomer's electricity consumption.59 The State of Michigan's involve-
ment was limited to approving a tariff which set forth the gratuitous
program. In addition, the power company's light bulb policy could
not be terminated without state permission. 0
Consequently, the Supreme Court, in Cantor, held that state
participation in the light bulb program was insufficient for purposes
of extending Parker immunity to the power company's activities.
The fragmented majority61 also justified denying the private party
protection from antitrust enforcement 62 by emphasizing that, along
with the absence of statutory authorization, the state's policy to-
wards the program was neutral.6"
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona," the Supreme Court again
examined the state action doctrine within the legal profession con-
text.65 The Court confronted the issue of attorney advertising in al-
leged violation of an Arizona Supreme Court disciplinary rule. 6 The
Bates Court distinguished Goldfarb and Cantor by construing Bates'
cause of action to be directed at the state because the real party in
interest was the Arizona Supreme Court.6 7 The Court, in Bates, con-
cluded that since the advertising restraint was the "affirmative com-
mand" of Arizona's highest court, it was compelled under the Gold-
farb state action immunity prerequisite. 8  Consequently, the
Sherman Act claim was barred by the Parker doctrine.
After rendering its decision in Bates, the United States Su-
preme Court had still not delivered an opinion specifically dealing
59. More specifically, the free light bulb policy provided new residents with light bulbs
in "such quantities as may be needed" for all of the residents' permanent fixtures. Henceforth,
the utility company would replace burned out light bulbs for residential customers in propor-
tion to the estimated amount of electricity they used for lighting purposes. Id. at 583 n.5.
60. The state of Michigan did not begin regulating electric utilities until 1909. The De-
troit Edison Company had been supplying light bulbs free of charge since 1886. Id.
61. See supra note 58.
62. Cantor's complaint asserted violations of §§ I and 2 of the Sherman Act. 428 U.S.
at 581 n.3.
63. The Court emphasized that "[nieither the Michigan Legislature, nor the [Michigan
Public Service] Commission, had even made any specific investigation of the desirability of
[such a] program or of its possible effect on competition in the light bulb market .... The
Commission's approval of [the] decision to maintain [the] program does not, therefore, imple-
ment any statewide policy relating to light bulbs." Id. at 584-85.
64. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
65. The Court "presaged" the Bates decision with its holding in Virginia Pharmacy
Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court
noted: " 'Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it wishes of its pharma-
cists; it may subsidize them or protect them from competition in other ways.' " Bates, 433 U.S.
at 362 n.16 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770).
66. 433 U.S. at 355.
67. Id. at 361. The Court considered the state bar's role to be completely defined in its
capacity as an agent of the Arizona Supreme Court and under its constant supervision. Id.
68. Id. at 360. The Court's rationale emphasized the presence of active state supervision.
Id. at 362. Also, the Court found it highly significant that the disciplinary rules reflected a
"clear articulation" of a state policy that is "clearly and affirmatively expressed." Id.
with anticompetitive municipal action in light of the Parker immu-
nity.' 9 Even though Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates delineated the
scope of the state action doctrine to some extent, uncertainty perme-
ated the issue whether anticompetitive municipal action was beyond
the reach of the Sherman Act.
Approximately one year after Bates, the Supreme Court in City
of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co.,7" investigated two
Louisiana municipalities that operated electrical utilities and alleg-
edly committed various antitrust offenses. 71  Hence, the Supreme
Court confronted the question of whether state action immunity ap-
plies to anticompetitive municipal action. In refusing to shield the
municipalities from the proscriptions of the antitrust laws, the dis-
harmonious majority72 ignored the preemption underpinnings of the
Parker decision. 73 The rationale offered in City of Lafayette was
predicated on the Court's notion that "there is a presumption against
implied exclusions from coverage of the antitrust laws." 74 The cities
answering the complaint did not demonstrate countervailing policies
to outweigh this presumption.75
The City of Lafayette Court recognized that anticompetitive
municipal action can, under certain circumstances, fall outside the
ambit of the Sherman Act. Interestingly, only a plurality could be
mustered to establish a test of immunity76 which focused on whether
the state subdivision's action was "pursuant to state policy to dis-
place competition with regulation or monopoly service."177 To qualify
for the immunity under this test, a municipality must demonstrate
that the state "authorized or directed" the act, and that the legisla-
69. While the Supreme Court had opted not to review the applicability of the Parker
doctrine to municipal anticompetitive activity up until Bates, the lower federal courts had
undertaken the task. In Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975), the court held
that municipal corporations charged with conspiring to prevent the sale of a particular bever-
age in municipal facilities were within the purview of the antitrust laws because of the absence
of a state statutory directive granting authority to participate in such a boycott. Accord Whit-
worth v. Perkin, 576 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978), reinstating 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied sub nor., City of Impact v. Whitworth, 435 U.S. 992 (1978) (city zoning ordinance
did not protect town from antitrust laws since ordinance was not product of state action).
70. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
71. Plaintiffs alleged that the municipalities sought to eliminate competition by use of
covenants in their debentures and by requiring Louisianaa Power's customers to purchase elec-
tricity from the municipalities as a condition of continued water and gas service. Id. at 392
n.6.
72. In the 5-4 decision, the majority opinion was actually part one of a three part plural-
ity opinion concurred in by Chief Justice Burger. Justice Brennan delivered the plurality opin-
ion, and was joined by Justices Stevens, Powell, and Marshall. Justice Marshall filed a concur-
ring opinion and Chief Justice Burger filed an opinion concurring in part one and in the
judgment. Justice Stewart delivered the dissent and was joined by Justices Rehnquist, White,
and Blackmun. Justice Blackmun also filed a dissenting opinion.
73. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
74. 435 U.S. at 413.
75. Id. at 414-15.
76. See supra note 72.
77. 435 U.S. at 413.
ture "contemplated" the action which invoked the complaint.7" The
municipalities in City of Lafayette failed to meet these standards. As
a result, the cities were precluded from providing services on a mo-
nopoly basis.
Two years subsequent, the Supreme Court, in California Retail
Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 9 crystallized the state
action analysis that had evolved through Parker, Goldfarb, Cantor,
Bates, and City of Lafayette to formulate two standards that state
action must meet to fall outside the scope of the antitrust laws. The
first standard required that the challenged restraint on trade be one
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy."8
Under the second standard, the policy must be "actively supervised"
by the state.8
The Midcal Court determined that the California wine pricing
system82 failed to fulfill the latter criterion.83 More importantly, the
Court essentially held that since the California statute was inconsis-
tent with the Sherman Act, it was invalid under the supremacy
clause of the Constitution.84
4. Community Communications Corp. v. City of Boul-
der.8 -The culmination of the Supreme Court's state action deci-
sions left the lower courts with one perplexing opinion addressing
anticompetitive municipal action.8" Thus, the Court deemed it im-
perative that the interaction between the Parker doctrine and munic-
ipal activity be clarified. Nevertheless, the Court simply added to the
perplexity8 7 by rendering its decision in Community Communica-
78. Id. at 414-15.
79. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
80. Id. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410).
81. Id.
82. The California program for wine pricing required that all wine producers, wholesal-
ers and rectifiers must file fair trade contracts or price schedules with the state. It also prohib-
ited state licensed wine merchants from selling wine to a retailer at any price other than that
set in an effective price schedule or in an effective trade contract. Id. at 99.
83. The Midcal Court noted that the pricing system met the first standard because the
legislative policy was evident from the system's purpose to permit resale price maintenance. Id.
The state, however, merely authorized price-setting and enforced the prices set by private par-
ties. Thus, the second requirement was not fulfilled. Id.
84. Id. at 102-06. See supra note 10. See also P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 1 212.1, at 46-47 (1982 Supp.) "Midcal: Restates Scope of Parker Immunity" [hereinaf-
ter cited as AREEDA & TURNER].
85. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
86. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). See supra
note 72.
87. For a commentator to address the state action doctrine with a term connoting per-
plexity is not unusual. See, e.g., 6 VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULA-
TION § 46.03[1], at 25 (1982) ("Court's failure to recognize the proper underpinnings of the
Parker v. Brown doctrine has resulted in utter confusion") [hereinafter cited as VON KALI-
NOWSKI]; Handler, see supra note 11, at 1378 ("the Parker conundrum").
tions Corp. v. City of Boulder."8
In City of Boulder, the Court held 9 a home-rule9" municipal
ordinance, 9' prohibiting expansion of a cable television supplier, sub-
ject to the Sherman Act. The fallacy in the Court's rationale for
refusing to implement the Parker doctrine was a reversion to an ex-
emption approach, despite the preemption analysis formulated in
Parker and restated in Midcal.
First, Boulder argued that the legislation met the state action
criteria of Parker because it was "an 'act of government' performed
by the city acting as the State in local matters .... ,192 The City of
Boulder Court rejected this proposition, for principles of federalism
dictate that while states have a significant measure of sovereignty,
municipalities "are not themselves sovereign."9 "
Boulder further contended that the cable television ordinance
was immune from antitrust enforcement because the Colorado Home
Rule Amendment fulfilled the requirement that an activity be per-
formed pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
state policy. 4 The Court again rejected Boulder's reasoning by find-
ing Colorado's position regarding the anticompetitive law to be one
of "precise neutrality." 95
88. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
89. Despite a majority vote, the coalition that produced the City of Boulder decision is
on unsteady ground. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion, and was joined by Justices Marshall,
Powell, Stevens, and Blackmun. The fifth vote was supplied, therefore, by Justice Blackmun
who was one of the dissenters in City of Lafayette, but changed his views without comment.
The dissent, in City of Boulder, was delivered by Justice Rehnquist, and was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor. The nonparticipating Justice, Byron White, was also one
of the dissenters in City of Lafayette. For a thorough overview of the City of Boulder opinion,
see Note, Home Rule Municipality's Ordinances Not Exempt from Sherman
Act-Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 12 SETON HALL 835 (1982),
90. The home rule amendment to the Colorado Constitution is designed to operate as
follows: "It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to the people coming within its
provisions the full right of self-government in both local and municipal matters. ... Id. at
43 n.] (citing Colorado Home Rule Amendment, Colo. Const. Art. XX, § 6). As of July 1,
1980, there were fifty-six home rule municipalities in Colorado. See Colorado Municipal
League, Municipal and County Officials in Colorado 1980 Directory, at 42 (1980). See gener-
ally Klemme, The Powers of Home Rule Cities in Colorado, 36 U. CoLo. L. REV. 321
(1964).
91. See supra note 15. The preamble to the Boulder ordinance stated, in part, that "the
City council finds that placing temporary geographical limitations upon the operations of
[CCC] would not impair the present services offered by [it] to City of Boulder residents." 455
U.S. at 46 n.7 (quoting Boulder, Colo., Ordinance 4473 (1979)).
92. 455 U.S. at 53 (emphasis in original). Boulder further argued that the only distinc-
tion between its situation and the situation in Parker is that "here the 'act of government' is
imposed by a home rule city rather than by the state legislature." Id. and n.17. Moreover, this
is a "distinction without a difference" because home rule cities in Colorado possess all the
power over local matters that the state legislature once possessed. Id.
93. Id. at 54 (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978)).
94. Id. at 54.
95. Id. at 55. Boulder also claimed antitrust immunity on the basis that the state legisla-
ture "contemplated the kind of action complained of." Id. (quoting City of Lafayette, 435
U.S. at 415). The Court countered that the present posture of the situation allowed one munic-
ipality to legislate in one direction, and another municipality to legislate in an opposite man-
Finally, the Supreme Court was unpersuaded by Boulder's as-
sertion that denying Parker doctrine protection would have "serious
adverse consequences for cities, and will unduly burden the federal
courts." 6 Instead, the Court summarily dismissed this contention,
noting the overriding policy favoring competition under the antitrust
laws.9 7
5. Exemption vis-a-vis Preemption.-The ensuing controversy
over whether anticompetitive municipal action is within the purview
of the Parker doctrine can be resolved by recognizing the true un-
derpinnings of the state action immunity. While both the Supreme
Court and the commentators have frequently analyzed state and mu-
nicipal action from an exemption perspective, the genuine preemp-
tion rationale, articulated in Parker v. Brown, awaits resuscitation.98
First, a clear understanding of the rudiments underlying these dia-
metrically opposed concepts is essential to properly dissect any state
action query. 99
Exemption involves the interplay between the enactments of a
single sovereign.' For example, a conflict might exist between the
Sherman Act and the subsequent passage of another federal regula-
tory scheme such as the Securities Exchange Act.1 'O Preemption,
however, involves the interaction of enactments by two different sov-
ereigns. To find preemption, therefore, the critical issue becomes
whether there is federal occupation of the particular field or whether
there is actual conflict between state and federal law.1
0 2
Along with this patent distinction, it is equally important to
identify the presumptions which underlie the respective principles.
At the outset, the acknowledgement that preemption is derived from
federalist principles, 10 3 and an antitrust exemption is not, indicates
ner. Id. at 56. Thus, "a State that allows its municipalities to do as they please can hardly be
said to have 'contemplated' the specific anticompetitive actions for which municipal liability is
sought." Id. at 55.
96. Id. at 56.
97. Id.
98. In support of this assertion, one commentator notes that "the key to unraveling the
Parker conundrum lies in the recognition that the state action doctrine is not an antitrust
,exemption' at all." Handler, supra note 11, at 1378.
99. See Handler, supra note I1, at 1378-88 (discussing the distinction between preemp-
tion and exemption). See generally I AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 84, 208, 209, & 1
212, at 58-64, 67-69 (1978) (overview of the interplay between state and federal antitrust law
in view of the Parker rationale).
100. In addition to the treatment by Handler, supra note I1, at 1378-88, exemption and
preemption are contrasted in a similar manner by Justice Rehnquist in his City of Boulder
dissent. See 455 U.S. 40, 61-62 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The improper exemption analysis
that many decisions subsequent to Parker have adopted is acknowledged for its misapplication
in VoN KALINOWSKI, supra note 87.
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
102. See supra note 46.
103. 455 U.S. at 61 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
that contradictory presumptions will be drawn.
Preemption rests on a presumption that weighs in favor of the
state law.1"" Thus, the Supreme Court has noted that the "exercise
of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed, ' 10 5 and, accord-
ingly, the Court is "generally reluctant to infer preemption." 100 With
exemption, on the other hand, the presumption is "against implied
exclusions from coverage under the antitrust laws.
10 7
The preemption foundation of the state action doctrine, as delin-
eated in Parker0 8 and restated in Midcal, has been generally over-
looked by the Supreme Court in other state action opinions."0 9
Proper recognition of the doctrine's genesis permits a logical exten-
sion to municipal activity despite the majority opinions in City of
Lafayette and City of Boulder.
The basis for applying the state action immunity to a munici-
pality is supported by the Supreme Court's decisions in City of Bur-
bank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc."O and Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. Detroit."' Both cases involved city ordinances that were con-
sidered in a preemption context. Moreover, the latter conflict re-
sulted in seven Justices upholding the city of Detroit's smoke abate-
ment code by deferring to a matter of purely local concern." 2
Consequently, the Court has never distinguished between states and
their subdivisions with regard to the preemptive effects of federal
law. 13 Accordingly, no justification exists for drawing a line between
a state and its municipalities in applying the Sherman Act.
Alternatively, the ramifications of withholding Parker doctrine
104. Id.
105. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973). The "presumption is that pre-emption is not to
be found absent the clear and manifest intention of Congress that the federal Act should
supersede the police powers of the States." 455 U.S. at 61 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (constru-
ing Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978)).
106. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978).
107. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978).
108. See supra note 46. In Parker, the Court cited the preemption axiom that
"[olccupation of a legislative 'field' by Congress in the exercise of a granted power is a famil-
iar example of [the] constitutional power to suspend state laws." 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943).
109. E.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). Cf
New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978). In Fox, the Court
addressed a state statute that required car manufacturers to secure state approval before open-
ing a dealership within an existing franchisee's marketing area if the competing franchisee
objected. The scheme was upheld on fourteenth amendment procedural due process grounds.
Id. at 101-08. As an aside, the Court utilized a preemptive approach to find the state action
within the scope of the Parker doctrine. Id. at 109. See also Cantor, 428 U.S. 579, 605-14
(1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (recognition given to a preemptive analysis for state action
issues).
110. 411 U.S. 624 (1973). Based on the supremacy clause, an ordinance prohibiting jet
take-offs during certain hours was ruled unconstitutional because it was preempted by. the
federal Noise Control Act of 1972. Id. at 626.
II1. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
112. Id. at 448.
113. City of Boulder, 445 U.S. 40, 69 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
protection will have a chilling impact on the broad range of activities
traditionally regulated at the municipal level. "" While federal pre-
emption of a local ordinance merely invalidates the law, the restric-
tive exemption approach exposes the municipality to the same penal-
ties imposed upon a private litigant.1 '
Placing a municipality on equal terms with a private party also
raises complex issues concerning the proper application of the "rule
of reason"116 and "per se" rule of illegality. 17 Under the rule of rea-
son rationale offered in National Society of Professional Engineers
v. United States,118 a municipality would be unable to defend its ac-
tion on grounds that "competition itself is unreasonable." 1 9 A mu-
nicipality could not, therefore, invoke traditional concerns such as
health, welfare, and safety on the rule's competitive scale. 20 A rule
of reason that permitted municipalities to defend anticompetitive or-
dinances on the basis of the law's benefits to the community would
merely revitalize a standardless substantive due process review of ec-
onomic regulation. 2 '
The query remains: "Is every city that granted a cable permit
114. See VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 87, at 34.4. In a speech delivered by a deputy
assistant attorney general from the Antitrust Division, entitled "Antitrust Comes to Main
Street," municipal officials were warned that an endless number of municipal activities might
be exposed to antitrust challenges. A sampling includes: (1) garbage collection; (2) parking
lots; (3) public health; (4) zoning; and (5) transit systems. Brief for Respondents, at 36 (citing
Remarks of Joe Simms, 72d Annual Conference of Municipal Finance Officers Association
(May 15, 1978)).
115. In City of Boulder, the majority opted not to confront the issue of remedies against
municipal officials. 455 U.S. at 56 n.20. The problem prompted Justice Rehnquist to respond,
"[ilt will take a considerable feat of judicial gymnastics to conclude that municipalities are not
subject to treble damages. . .. " Id. at 65 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The importance of
this troublesome area is exemplified by the $540 million treble damage claim in City of Lafay-
ette, 435 U.S. 389, 440 (1978). For a thorough discussion of the pending uncertainty over the
liability of public agencies and officials see AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 84, 212.2, at 47-
52. Notably, § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982), is mandatory: "any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws ...shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained."
116. A popular statement of the rule of reason is the following:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regu-
lates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). See also Continental
T.V., Inc. v. G. T. E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See generally Posner, The Rule of
Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Cm. L.
REv. 1 (1977).
117. Under the "per se" rule of illegality, certain business practices are so anticompeti-
tive that there is no need to consider any possible justification for them. See Northern Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See generally Bork, supra note 31.
118. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
119. Id. at 696 quoted in City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 66 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
120. 455 U.S. 40, 66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 67-68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
15 or 20 years ago, as Boulder did, to be saddled with the same
monopoly operator and the same permit because legitimate govern-
mental acts to modify the permit are subject to Sherman Act at-
tack?" '22 The inequity of not extending the Parker immunity to an-
ticompetitive municipal action must be rectified.123
IV. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
1. Background.-To fully realize the scope of the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine, like the Parker immunity, it is necessary to ex-
amine the concept's evolution through decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc. 24 represents the birth of the tenet that con-
certed efforts to obtain anticompetitive executive, judicial or legisla-
tive action are shielded from the proscriptions of the Sherman
Act.1
25
In Noerr, the Court granted certiorari for a treble-damage anti-
trust action brought by certain trucking companies126 against a con-
tingency of railroads. 27 The truckers alleged that the railroads had
conspired to restrain trade and monopolize the long distance freight
business. This conspiracy claim was predicated upon allegations that
the railroads had mounted an intensive publicity campaign against
the trucking industry "designed to foster the adoption and retention
of laws and law enforcement practices destructive of the trucking
business ... ."12" More particularly, the railroads had attempted to
influence legislation and had persuaded the Governor of Pennsylva-
122. Brief for Respondent, at 38, City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
123. Of the approximately thirty decisions since City of Boulder that have considered
the state action defense in light of municipal anticompetitive activity, the general rule has been
an exemption approach and not a preemption rationale. See, e.g., Euster v. Eagle Downs Rac-
ing Association, 677 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1982); Pueblo Aircraft Service, Inc. v. City of Pueblo,
679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982).
124. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
125. See supra note 3. Prior to Noerr, it was acknowledged that a businessman could
individually influence government action that had an anticompetitive effect on his competitors.
See. e.g., United States v. Association of Am. R.R., 4 F.R.D. 510, 527 (D. Neb. 1945) (the
court recognized the first amendment protection applicable to such activity on an individual
basis, but cautioned that similar acts "done in concert to further the designs of a conspiracy
and combination" would not receive the same constitutional protection). See generally Note,
The Brakes Fail on the Noerr Doctrine-Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport
Co. (N.D. Cal. 1967), 57 CALIF. L. REV. 518 (1969).
126. The complaint was filed on behalf of forty-one Pennsylvania truck operators and
their trade association, the Pennsylvania Motor Truck Association. 365 U.S. at 129.
127. Suit was brought against twenty-four eastern railroads, an association of the presi-
dents of those railroads known as the Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference, and a public
relations firm. Id.
128. Id. The truckers also alleged that the purpose of the publicity campaign was to
"create an atmosphere of distaste for the truckers among the general public, and to impair the
relationships existing between the truckers and their customers." Id. The complaint described
the railroads conduct as "'vicious, corrupt, and fraudulent.'" Id.
nia to veto a bill favorable to the trucking industry.129
The Supreme Court commenced the Noerr opinion by proposing
"that no violation of the [Sherman] Act can be predicated upon
mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws." 30
In addition, the Court emphasized that the antitrust laws do not pro-
hibit even joint efforts by businessmen to influence legislation or ex-
ecutive action that would produce a restraint or monopoly.
' 131
Essentially, the Noerr Court provided three related grounds for
its unanimous decision in favor of the railroads. First, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that the constitutional basis for the railroad's
activities stemmed from the right to petition.13 2 Second, the Court
cautioned that a "chilling" effect on such political activity would
substantially impair the power of government to take actions
through the legislative and executive branches.1 33 Last, the Court
cited the "essential dissimilarity" between joint efforts to persuade
legislation or law enforcement, and concerted activities traditionally
prohibited 3  under the Sherman Act.1
3 5
In 1965, the basic antitrust immunity established in Noerr was
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Pen-
nington.3 6 In cooperation with union officials, several large coal
companies had acted to eliminate smaller competitors. These efforts
focused on persuading the Secretary of Labor to set a higher mini-
mum wage for companies selling coal to the Tennessee Valley
Authority.
3 7
Relying on the Noerr rationale, the Pennington Court found for
the union officials and the larger companies that sought the anticom-
petitive result. In reaching its decision, the Court held that "[uJoint
129. The proposed legislation, entitled the "Fair Truck Bill," would have permitted
truckers to carry heavier loads on Pennsylvania roads. Id. at 130.
130. Id. at 135.
131. Id. at 136. The Court precisely noted that "the Sherman Act does not prohibit two
or more persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the
executive to take particular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint or a
monopoly." Id.
132. Id. at 138. The United States Constitution provides: "Congress shall make no law
* . . abridging . . . the right . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
133. 365 U.S. at 137. The Court emphasized the government impairment argument by
adding that, "[iln a representative democracy ... [the] branches of government act on behalf
of the people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept of representation depends upon the
ability of the people to make their wishes known to their representatives." Id.
134. The Court mentioned devices such as price fixing agreements, boycotts, and market
division agreements. Id. at 136.
135. Id.
136. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
137. Id. at 660. Persuading the enactment of favorable wage laws was allegedly only
part of a much larger plan that included "destructive and collusive price-cutting" and attempts
to exclude the smaller companies from the market by refusing to lease them coal lands and
persuading the TVA to buy only from companies that paid a high minimum wage. Id. at 660-
61.
efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws
even though intended to eliminate competition."' 8 The Supreme
Court reiterated the Noerr proposition that such attempts are
shielded from the Sherman Act "regardless of intent or purpose."' 139
Seven years after Pennington, the Court issued its second major
decision that embraced the philosophy spawned in Noerr. In Califor-
nia Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,140 the Court broad-
ened the scope of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine by relying on the
concept's first amendment underpinnings.
14 1
The conflict in California Motor Transport centered on a claim
that certain truckers had conspired to deter competitors from ob-
taining operating rights from state and federal regulatory agencies
by opposing every application filed by a competitor, regardless of its
merits. The Court recognized that "the right to petition extends to
all departments of the Government.""' 2 Moreover, the Supreme
Court held that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects efforts to in-
fluence, not only legislative and executive bodies, but judicial and
administrative processes as well. 43 Nevertheless, the California Mo-
tor Transport Court dismissed the complaint because the cause of
action was within the realm of the "sham exception"" to Noerr-
Pennington immunity.
2. In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation."45-Since
the California Motor Transport opinion expanded the coverage of
138. Id. at 670. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
139. Id.
140. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
141. Many lower courts have capitalized on the permissive language in Noerr and Pen-
nington when applying antitrust immunity to various attempts at influencing a potpourri of
government officials. See, e.g., Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp. v. National Council of Architec-
tural Registration Bds., 1975 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 60,108 (D.D.C. 1975) (efforts to influence
standards set by state licensing boards); Hackensack Water Co. v. Village of Nyack, 289 F.
Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (efforts to influence condemnation proceedings). But cf. Austra-
lia/Eastern U.S.A. Shipping Conference v. United States, 537 F. Supp. 807 (D. D.C. 1982)
(Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not shield parties petitioning foreign governments); George
R. Whitten, J., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (lst Cir. 1970) (no immunity
for attempt to influence officials partaking in commercial activity). See generally VON KALI-
NOWSKI, supra note 87, § 46.04[31, at 47-56.
142. 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1977). See also Mark Aero, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
580 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1978) (city council); Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461
F.2d 506 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001 (1972) (city council); Sun Valley Disposal
Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969) (county commission).
143. 404 U.S. at 510-11.
144. Id. at 510-13. The Noerr Court stated the basic proposition for a "sham exception"
to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, The Court, in Noerr, remarked that there may be situations
in which attempts to influence government action is a "mere sham to cover what is actually
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competi-
tor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified." 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961). For
a thorough treatment of the sham exception, see generally Balmer, Sham Litigation and the
Antitrust Laws, 29 BUFFALO L. REv. 39 (1980).
145. 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,039 (9th Cir. 1982).
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and reinforced its first amendment
foundation, the Supreme Court has not found adequate cause to ex-
pound upon this particular antitrust principle.14 Nonetheless, the
Noerr-Pennington immunity remains a controversial topic4 in anti-
trust analysis. One common dispute turns on the pivotal issue that
the Ninth Circuit addressed in In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust
Litigation.14 8 The Airport Car Rental court held that there is no
commercial exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, but simulta-
neously exposed certain inconsistencies in maintaining such a broad
application of the doctrine.
In Airport Car Rental, Budget Rent-A-Car objected to the No-
err-Pennington protection extended to the concerted efforts of "in-
dustry giants," Hertz and National, 4 9 who had successfully lobbied
airport officials to exclude potential competitors. The means of ostra-
cizing the smaller companies involved prompting the enactment of
restrictive eligibility criteria for on-airport car rental operations.15 °
The Ninth Circuit reached its decision by acknowledging the
"twin pillars" upholding the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.1 5' These ba-
ses comprised the first amendment right to petition and the signifi-
cance of "free-flowing communication" in a representative democ-
racy.11 52  Budget argued, however, for applying a commercial
exception on the basis that the airport was operated as a commer-
cial, profit oriented enterprise. Hence, Budget contended that the
public officials involved did not perform a policymaking function
within the purview of the Noerr-Pennington exemption.153
146. The lower federal courts have frequently availed themselves of the doctrine despite
the Supreme Court's disregard after California Motor Transport. E.g., George R. Whitten,
Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850
(1970).
147. Some lower court opinions have protected abusive lobbying tactics under the No-
err-Pennington doctrine by citing a statutory construction justification instead of the first
amendment. E.g., Cow Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 696 (D.
Colo. 1975).
148. 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,039 (9th Cir. 1982).
149. See supra note 21.
150. See supra note 22. Budget also alleged that Hertz and National engaged in other
conduct not within the ambit of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. These allegations included
bribing airport officials, bringing baseless lawsuits, making bad faith misrepresentations of offi-
cials, and submitting illegally fixed prices for car rentals to the officials for their summary
approval. Airport Car Rental, 1982-83 Trade Cas., at 70,792 n.l.
151. Id. at 70,792 (construing California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)).
152. Id. For an excellent analysis of the development of the right to petition, see Fischel,
Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 80, 94-100 (1977).
153. Most courts apply the Noerr-Pennington shield regardless of the context in which
joint efforts to influence government officials occurs, but a commercial exception is invoked by
some federal courts. See. e.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424
F.2d 25 (1st Cir), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970). For an extensive treatment of the com-
mercial exception controversy, see Comment, Noerr-Pennington Antitrust, supra note 20. The
major obstacle to establishing a commercial exception is the difficulty in distinguishing be-
The Airport Car Rental court refused to follow this line of rea-
soning and, accordingly, held that the nature of the government was
simply "one factor in determining the type of public input acceptable
to the particular decision-making process." 54 Furthermore, the
Ninth Circuit noted that the limited first amendment protection af-
forded commercial speech, 5  and the petitioning of non-elected offi-
cials of a subordinate state agency,' 58 although highly relevant, did
not preclude Noerr-Pennington coverage for Hertz and National. 57
3. "Holmesian'58 Analysis.'"-The right to petition the gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances has been described as "among
the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of
Rights."' 59 To apply such constitutional protection to the concerted
efforts of businessmen to influence government action, and com-
pletely ignore the purpose to eliminate competition suggests, how-
ever, a throwback to a Holmesian approach to the antitrust laws.
Justice Holmes' economic philosophy was diametrically opposed
to the policy of preserving competition implicit in the Sherman
Act. 160 Contrary to the purpose of the antitrust laws, Holmes wel-
comed economic concentration,' 6 ' praised combinations, and de-
tween a government function and a proprietary one. Id. at 761-63. For an incisive overview of
this difficult distinction, see 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 2, § 10.05, at 743-49 (3d ed. 1979).
154. 1982-83 Trade Cas., at 70,794. But cf. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock
Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (Ist Cir), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970). The First Circuit
emphasized that "[tihe entire thrust of Noerr is aimed at insuring uninhibited access to gov-
ernment policy makers . . . [and] [bly 'enforcement of laws' we understand some significant
policy determination in the application of a statute, not a technical decision about the best
kind of weld to use in a swimming pool gutter." Id. at 32. Thus, the Whitten court refused to
extend the Noerr-Pennington immunity to efforts to sell products to public officials acting
under competitive bidding statutes. Id. at 33.
155. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S.
557, 562-63 (1980). See also Comment, Noerr-Pennington Antitrust, supra note 20, at 763-
66.
156. Budget supported its argument, that Noerr-Pennington protection should be pre-
cluded if non-elected officials of a subordinate state agency are involved, by citing California
Motor Transport, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), in which the Court noted that "[m]isrepresentations,
condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory process." Id.
at 513. Accord Clipper Exxprcss v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 674 F.2d
1252, 1269-73 (9th Cir. 1982).
157. Airport Car Rental, 1982-83 Trade Cas., at 70, 792-93.
158. Oliver Wendell Homes (1841-1935) was appointed to the United States Supreme
Court by Theodore Roosevelt in 1902 and served for thirty years. See generally S. BENT,
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (1932).
159. United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
160. See supra notes 24 & 28 and accompanying text.
161. While serving on the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, Justice Holmes voiced his
support for the concentration of economic power in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 108,
44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896). Holmes stated,
it is plain from the slightest consideration of practical affairs, or the most super-
ficial reading of industrial history, that free competition means combination, and
that the organization of the world, now going on so fast, means an ever increas-
ing might and scope of combination. It seems to me futile to set our faces
against this tendency.Whether beneficial on the whole, as I think it, or detrimen-
tal, it is inevitable, unless the fundamental axioms of society, and even the fun-
nounced competition for its inherent inefficiency and the waste it
produced.
16 2
The paradigmatic Holmesian opinion on the application of the
antitrust law is Justice Holmes' dissent in Northern Securities Co. v.
United States.16 The Court, in Northern Securities, investigated the
Great Northern Railway Company and the Northern Pacific Rail-
way, which owned164 competing and substantially parallel lines ex-
tending from the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River to the Pa-
cific Ocean. A scheme was devised in which the shareholders of the
respective companies formed a holding company under the laws of
New Jersey. The holding company then exchanged its stock165 for a
controlling interest in the capital stock of each of the railroad com-
panies. The majority in Northern Securities1 66 held that the com-
pany constituted a combination that restrained trade in violation of
the Sherman Act.
Justice Holmes, however, viewed the plan to be no more than an
effort, beyond the constitutional reach of Congress, to control dispo-
damental conditions of life, are to be changed.
(quoted in I M. HANDLER, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF ANTITRUST 25-26 n.109 (1973)).
162. See I M. HANDLER, supra note 161, at 17-18 (citing I HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS
123, May 25, 1906). Holmes' refusal to accept competition within American industries as a
summum bonum, and his disbelief in the Sherman Act, were carryovers from his outlook on
life in general. "In private, Holmes was a fairly stock Social Darwinist" who advocated a
theory of inevitable development and became abhorrent to ideas of Hobbesian chaos and atom-
istic competition. See W. LETWIN, supra note 1, at 234-35. Despite his open disdain for the
Sherman Act, Holmes wrote the opinion for the United States Supreme Court in fifteen anti-
trust cases. E.g., United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S, 202 (1913) (approved the integration of
three noncompeting but dominant manufacturers in the same business). Before Holmes retired
from the United States Supreme Court, he participated in 112 antitrust cases. See I M. HAN-
DLER, supra note 161, at 22-24 n.107. Justice Holmes expressed concern over the potential
conflict of interests that could arise in his decision-making by remarking,
I have been in a minority of one as to the proper administration of the Sherman
Act. I hope and believe that I am not influenced by my opinion that it is a
foolish law. I have little doubt that the country likes it and I always say, as you
know, that if my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them.
Id. at 20 (quoting I HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 248-49, March 4, 1920; id. at 251, March 11,
1920).
163. 193 U.S. 197, 400-11 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). While Holmes himself real-
ized that he practically stood alone in his views, his antitrust record did not suffer for its
"meagerness." See I M. HANDLER, supra note 161, at 17. The dissent in Northern Securities
is a prime example: "It is one of Holmes' masterpieces, full of literary flourishes, intellectual
forcefulness, and sophisticated political theory; in all these branches, and as a display of vivid
personality, it makes its counterparts look crude and unreflective." W. LETWIN, supra note 1,
at 229. For a comprehensive overview of Justice Holmes' more significant opinions, see gener-
ally Fallon, Some Influences of Justice Holmes' Thought on Current Law-Monopolies and
Restraint of Trade, 54 DICK. L. REV. 246 (1949-50).
164. The railroads in Northern Securities were "upstaged by two human defendants
who might have been delegated to personify the popular idea of Big Business and High Fi-
nance. ... W. LETWIN, supra note I, at 182. James J. Hill was the high powered owner of
Great Northern. J. Pierpont Morgan, the banking magnate, controlled Northern Pacific. See
generally id. at 182-95 (thorough account of the scheming between these men).
165. The certificate of incorporation authorized capital stock in the amount of $400 mil-
lion at a par value of $100. 193 U.S. at 323.
166. The majority opinion was delivered by Justice Harlan. See supra note 163.
sitions of stock in a state chartered corporation. 0 7 The purpose of
the Northern Securities Company, Holmes contended, was to make
valid contracts to purchase and sell stocks, not unlawful contracts to
restrain trade.
In effect, Justice Holmes structured his analysis in a form-over-
substance approach.16 8 With respect to railroads, he regarded size as
an inevitable incident,6 9 and sharply criticized the government for
punishing a purchaser of stock in two railroad companies because of
a remote result that may or may not even occur.
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4. Holmesian Analysis vis-a-vis Noerr-Pennington Doc-
trine.-The Noerr-Pennington doctrine smacks of Justice Holmes'
form-over-substance philosophy. 171 In In re Airport Car Rental Anti-
trust Litigation, 72 Hertz and National joined forces and mounted an
intensive and conceivably unethical 73 campaign aimed solely at
prohibiting potential competitors from the on-airport car rental mar-
ket. In Holmesian fashion, the Ninth Circuit immunized the joint
efforts of the businessmen from the antitrust proscriptions that were
intended to preserve competition. Although the intent of the car
rental companies and the purpose sought were clearly anticompeti-
tive, the court bypassed a close examination of the substance of the
scheme in lieu of the participant's right to petition.
Essentially, the Airport Car Rental court complied with
Holmes' contention that the result, an anticompetitive ordinance per-
haps, is too far removed from the petitioning activities.' 7' Moreover,
even though the government is not required to meet the petitioners'
167. Justice Holmes concluded by commenting on the majority's interpretation of the
Sherman Act. Holmes noted that by following the majority's rationale,
[we] would make eternal the bellum omnium contra omnes and disintegrate so-
ciety so far as it could into individual atoms. . . . It would be an attempt to
reconstruct society. I am not concerned with the wisdom of such an attempt, but
I believe that Congress was not instructed by the Constitution with the power to
make it, and I am deeply persuaded that it has not tried.
193 U.S. at 411 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
168. Another prominent opinion of Justice Holmes that illustrates his shrewd approach
to not only antitrust law but to business transactions in general is Old Dominion Copper Min-
ing & Smelting v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206 (1908) (promoters who reaped "secret profits"
from a corporation are not liable for breach of duty). Contra Old Dominion Copper Mining &
Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193, aff'd, 225 U.S. 111 (1912).
169. 193 U.S. at 407 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes also noted that if size had been
an objection under the Sherman Act, then both railroads "already were too great and encoun-
tered the law." Id. at 408.
170. Id. at 403 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
171. While commentators will not hesitate to attest to the keen insight that Holmes
possessed, they will hasten to add that his antitrust policy was misdirected. "It seems fair to
say that the structure [Holmes] suggested was keyed to no particular intelligible policy and
that the oblivion into which it lapsed was well earned." BORK, supra note 31, at 811.
172. 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,039 (9th Cir. 1982).
173. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
expectations, allowing such concerted activity to continue unchecked
is condoning, if not contributing, to Holmes' principle of inevitable
development 75 and his belief in economic concentration.
176
5. Implications from Economic Concentration.-The apparent
Holmesian analysis that courts have adopted raises an inherent con-
flict within the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The countervailing forces
are the right to petition and the pro-competitive Sherman Act. Con-
ceivably, courts might not grant the first amendment such a broad
application if the impact of economic concentration 177 was consid-
ered in this balancing process.
Economic concentration in a situation similar to In re Airport
Car Rental Antitrust Litigation,17 would be undesirable for several
reasons. First, the more concentrated the market, the easier it is for
the on-airport businesses to cooperate and seek to influence govern-
ment officials. 179 Theoretically, this factor could lead to the ascen-
dency of the most powerful company as more restrictive legislation
was repeatedly enacted.
Second, a concentrated industry is in a better position to sup-
press competition through private agreement, express or tacit, than
an unconcentrated arrangement.180 One form of such collusion is
price fixing. The feasibility of this type of a scheme depends upon
coordination, or bargaining, costs' 1 and the costs of enforcing the
agreement"8 2 to prevent cheating.
8 3
The argument that has traditionally undermined this second
contention is that a collusive agreement which results in an artifi-
cially high price will entice rivals to enter the market and sell their
product at a lower, yet still profitable, price. The intervention of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, however, and the protection extended to
joint efforts to influence the enactment of anticompetitive legislation,
raises barriers to entry for potential competitors. For example, the
175. See supra note 162.
176. See supra note 161.
177. For a discussion asserting that concentrating is undesirable, see J. BAIN, INDUS-
TRIAL ORGANIZATION 36-38 (1968). See also Bain, Relation of Profit-Rate to Industry Con-
centration: American Industry 1936-40, 65 Q.J. ECON. 293 (1951).
178. 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,039.
179. See R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 18.
180. Id.
181. Posner, Oligopoly and Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV.
1562, 1570 (1969). A price fixing agreement requires costly bargaining among the parties. Id.
182. Id. Coordination costs, are determined "by the number of sellers whose actions
must be coordinated and by the differences in costs, product, and judgment among the sellers."
Id.
183. Id. A seller in a concentrated market might "cheat" on the agreed upon price ei-
ther inadvertently or because others are suspected to be cheating. Id. The company also might
be trying to reap short term gains that would outweigh the subsequent collapse of the agree-
ment. Id. Finally, the participant may cheat simply because of a lack of confidence in the
agreement itself. Id. See also R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 53-54.
ordinance in Airport Car Rental effectually established a monopoly
over the on-airport car rental market for Hertz and National.
Last, a concentrated industry is undesirable for policy reasons
alone. Thus, the reduction of the number of firms in an industry
might be considered antithetical to the purpose of the Sherman Act
in upholding competition through the preservation of the smaller
firm.1
8 4
The chief argument in favor of concentration stems from the
belief that marketing and production costs decline because of econo-
mies of scale and other forms of superior performance achieved by
larger firms."" Furthermore, it is arguable that, although an abnor-
mally high price is maintained in a concentrated market, rival firms
do not enter because they cannot match the efficient level of opera-
tion of the larger firms. 8 As already noted, the present posture of
the situation in Airport Car Rental renders this final factor moot
since anticompetitive legislation was successfully obtained.
Although there are plausible arguments for and against concen-
tration in the market place,'87 the dominant, but by no means uni-
versal, opinion among antitrust commentators and economists is that
firms in concentrated markets will charge abnormally high prices
through "mutual self-interest."' 88 Moreover, this will occur with or
without an overt agreement amongst the participants. 8 9
The impact that economic concentration has on a market does
not mandate, or even suggest, that courts reevaluate their priorities
and elevate Sherman Act interests over first amendment interests. It
does, however, appear recommendable that courts at least heighten
the scrutiny they apply to schemes traditionally shielded under the
Noerr-Pennington immunity. In a similar manner, courts might also
take heed of the long term ramifications stemming from the enact-
ment of anticompetitive legislation.
V. Proposals
The interplay between the Parker doctrine and the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine creates an anomaly that plagues the municipal set-
184. R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 99.
185. Id. at 100. See generally Peltzman, The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concen-
tration, 20 J. L. & ECON. 229 (1977) (Peltzman argues that deconcentration will increase
costs).
186. See, e.g., Bork, Antitrust and the Theory of Concentrated Markets, reprinted in
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND THE MARKET SYSTEM 81 (E. Fox & J. Halverson ed. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION].
187. Compare Brozen, The Concentration-Collusion Doctrine, reprinted in INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION, supra note 186, at 90-120 with Scherer, Structure-Performance Relation-
ships and Antitrust Policy, reprinted in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra note 186, at 128.
188. See R. BORK, supra note 30, at 102.
189. Id.
ting. Currently, the potency exists under the antitrust laws for a mu-
nicipality to be constrained from enacting anticompetitive legislation,
while joint attempts by private parties to influence municipal officials
to pass such legislation are safeguarded. Rectification of the situa-
tion cannot, and should not, be achieved through a crusade for the
symmetrical application of these two distinct doctrinal approaches.19
Both concepts evolved from divergent geneses that must be respected
accordingly.
Nonetheless, refuge exists for the municipality should courts ac-
knowledge that the Parker doctrine is predicated on principles of
preemption and not exemption."9 ' An expeditious resolution would
allow, once again, cities and towns to act in the best interests of their
communities without the impending threat of a Sherman Act attack.
Encouragingly, there has been a response to this predicament. A
Senate bill was recently introduced with the intended purpose of ex-
tending antitrust immunity to local governments for activities that
are not subject to antitrust proscriptions on the state level. 92 The
impetus behind this proposed legislation is the position taken by the
Justice Department and the bills sponsors that there are neither
"sufficient [nor] compelling reasons to treat the legitimate activities
of local governments differently from those of State government
under the antitrust laws." '93
The burden on municipalities could be further alleviated if the
courts, while continuing to recognize the first amendment underpin-
nings of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, would sensitize themselves
to the economic implications involved. An antitrust policy that was
more critical in examining concerted business activities that sought
to influence municipal officials to take anticompetitive action would
190. See, e.g., New Mexico v. American Petrofina, 501 F.2d 363, 368 (9th Cir. 1974).
191. For interpretations of the Parker doctrine by lower courts subsequent to the Su-
preme Court's decision in City of Boulder, see, e.g., Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 1983-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,356 (N.D. Ohio, 1983); Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v.
SIDA of Hawaii, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 712 (D. Hawaii 1983).
192. 5.1578, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)
193. Thurmond Introduces Bill to Extend Parker to Local Government Regulation,
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1122, at 22 (July 7, 1983) (quoting Sen. Strom
Thurmond, Chairman of Senate Judiciary Committee). The relevant text the Thurmond bill
reads as follows:
5.1578 A bill to clarify the application of the Federal antitrust laws to local
governments .... Sec. 2. The Federal Antitrust laws shall not apply to any law
or other action of, or official action directed by, a city, village, town, township,
county, or other general function unit of local government in the exercise of its
regulatory powers, including but not limited to zoning, franchising, licensing,
and the establishment of monopoly public services, but excluding any activity
involving the sale of goods or services by the unit of local government in compe-
tition with private persons, where such law or action is valid under state law,
except to the extent that the Federal antitrust laws would apply to a similar law
or action of, or official action directed by, a State ....
5.1578, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
conceivably narrow the loophole that leads to potentially undesirable
economic concentration." 4
VI. Conclusion
General neglect has not caused the present difficulty in discern-
ing the parameters of the Parker and Noerr-Pennington doctrines.
Actually, the Supreme Court has endeavored on numerous occasions
to attain practicable and definitive solutions for these well estab-
lished, yet perplexing, antitrust policies.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court must, once again, reconcile
these countervailing doctrines, unless it desires that municipalities be
eviscerated of their ability to pursue legitimate social objectives at
the local level. Furthermore, the Court's reevaluation of the interac-
tion between the Parker and Noerr-Pennington doctrines must ac-
count for the true legal issues involved as well as the economic impli-
cations that those antitrust principles invoke.
DAVID B. PROKOP
194. In some situations concentration may actually be desirable. E.g., Duke & Co. v.
Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975). See Comment, Noerr-Pennington Antitrust, supra
note 20, at 768.

